All state-wide and

Fixed effects

cross sectional

clustered randomization

DID

RDD

Governorships

**Elections will be held for the governorships of 36 states and three territories.** gubernatorial elections.

**Secretaries of state will be elected in twenty-seven states.**]

**State treasurers** and equivalents will be elected in twenty-seven states

Main article: 2022 United States state legislative elections

**The vast majority of states and territories will hold legislative elections in 2022**.

The

Robustness check – two way fixed effects design

Clustered randomization to effects within groups

Treatment effect – what kind?

Difference in Means?

Difference in differences?

Discontituity

Multiple comparisons.

Compiler averate causal effects

Sharp null

Difference in differences

Cross-sectional time series

DRD

Time varying confounders

*complier average causal effects*

1. Kalla and Broockman explain “Random assignment . . . ensures that significant differences . . . across . . . [treatment] conditions can only be attributed to the randomly assigned treatment: whether congressional officials were informed that meeting attendees were campaign donors.” (551) Random assignment deals with confounders by distributing them equally between treatment groups.
2. Fixed effects model
3. CEM. Describe how these remedial measures work. How are they different from one another?
4. In Figures 1, 3, & 4, the authors report *complier average causal effect*estimates (CACE) to describe the treatment effect. What is this statistical technique used for and why is it applied in this paper?

Sldihflfh—odi vdlh

**The Effect of Television Advertising in United States Elections**

1. Sides, Vavreck, and Warshaw account for time invariant and time varying confounders with a fixed effects model. Specifically, county, state-year, and district-year fixed effects are employed to account for trends and local- or state-level confounders such as partisan orientation or race specific dynamics. How do the authors account for unobserved confounders, such as strategic ad spending by political campaigns?
2. How do the authors measure persuasion and mobilization? What are observable implications of each? How do the authors’ test these variables for a relationship to TV advertising?
3. Sides, Vavreck, and Warshaw also test for relationships between TV ads and valance, ideological proximity, and knowledge. How do the authors go about doing this and what do they find?
4. The authors use “time-series cross-sectional models with a difference-in-differences design and a border-discontinuity design.” (2) Describe these four techniques and how they work together in the authors’ parallel research designs.
5. Figure 3 illustrates the down ballot effects of TV advertisements. How do the authors make sense of this finding? How does the finding affect strategic considerations of political parties going forward?

**The Minimal Persuasive Effects of Campaign Contact in General Elections: Evidence from 49 Field Experiments**

1. Kalla and Broockman test for relationship between campaign contacting / advertising and persuasion. In this case, why is the *null result*a finding? How does it make sense of the previous literature?
2. What is the minimal effects thesis? The authors argue a strong version of the minimal effects thesis holds, “not because campaign effects cancel each other out, but because they have no average effects at all.” (150) Do you agree? Remember that the authors are asking about advertising and contacting effects, not campaign effects broadly speaking.
3. Under what circumstances can voters be persuaded to change their vote? Under what circumstances do campaigns have zero persuasive effect?
4. According to the authors, contacting / advertising has no effect on general election outcomes when partisan cues and competing frames are present. How does this apply to independents? What do the authors say? Are you persuaded?
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**Campaign Contributions Facilitate Access to Congressional Officials: A Randomized Field Experiment**

1. What is the sharp null hypothesis or null hypothesis of no effect? How does the assumption allow for the stipulation of all counterfactual outcomes? How is it similar to and different from the null hypothesis?
2. Kalla and Broockman use a randomized field design in which congressional offices are randomly assigned a treatment condition: Constituent or Revealed Donor. Describe these two treatment conditions. What information was collected as the outcome variable? How did the authors use that data to further operationalize the concept of access?
3. What procedures were used by research staff to ensure consistency in the data collection process?
4. “A common critique of the original literature on ‘minimal effects’ was that campaigns may not appear to have aggregate effects because any advertising they engage in is immediately reciprocated with responses from their opponents that ‘cancel out’ in aggregate. Importantly, because the studies we analyze and present are individually randomized, they are not susceptible to this critique: it is not possible for an opposing campaign to reciprocate advertising to the treatment group but not the control group in these experiments, unless it somehow had knowledge of the treatment and control group assignments.” What research designs would be appropriate for examining the canceling-out hypothesis?
5. Why is this paper groundbreaking?

**General Discussion**

1. Kalla and Broockman explain “Random assignment . . . ensures that significant differences . . . across . . . [treatment] conditions can only be attributed to the randomly assigned treatment: whether congressional officials were informed that meeting attendees were campaign donors.” (551) Random assignment deals with confounders by distributing them equally between treatment groups. Other methods for addressing confounders include fixed effects modeling and coarsened exact matching. Describe how these remedial measures work. How are they different from one another?
2. Kalla and Broockman write “These findings underscore concerns about the Supreme Court's recent decisions deregulating campaign finance.” Citizens United vs FEC was decided on the grounds of free speech. Kalla and Broockman find evidence that political contributions secure unequal access to the political process. Did the Supreme Court make a mistake?
3. Is it possible to have too many statistical tests? Is it possible to have too few? Compare and contrast the research designs in the two Kalla and Broockman articles. Are the results reported in these papers appropriate given the respective research designs?
4. Kalla and Broockman find the minimal effects thesis holds under certain circumstances. On the other hand, Sides, Vavreck, and Warshaw find support for the persuasive effect of TV advertising in down ballot races. According to the authors, this is because voters have less developed opinions about local politics. What does the logic imply for other forms of persuasion at the local level?
5. Kalla and Broockman find a null result for the relationship between advertising and persuasion. But Sides, Vavreck, and Warshaw find that TV advertising matters up and down the ballot. Which is more persuasive? Which has the better research design and why?

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# Elections in the United States

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(Howard, et al. n.d.) (Carley, et al. 2011)